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This  paper  will  use  the  popular  television
character,  Dexter  Morgan,  to  interrogate  the
relationship  between  self  and  persona,  and
unsettle  the  distinction  between  the  two  terms.
This operation will enable me to raise a series of
questions  about  the  critical  vocabulary  and  scholarly
agenda  of  the  nascent  discipline  of  persona  studies,
which, I argue, needs to develop a critical genealogy of
the  term  “persona.”  This  paper  makes  a  modest
contribution  to  such  a  project  by  drawing  attention  to
some  key  questions  regarding  the  discourse  of
authenticity  in  persona  studies.  For  those  not  familiar
with the show, Dexter portrays the life of a serial killer
who only kills other serial killers. This is because Dexter,
under  the  tutelage  of  his  deceased  father,  develops  a
code that enables him to find a “socially useful” purpose
for his homicidal impulses—by exclusively targeting other
killers  he  rationalises  his  own  deadly  acts.  Dexter
necessarily leads a double life, which entails performing a
series  of  normative  social  roles  that  conceal  his  true
identity,  and  the  murderous  activities  of  his  “dark
passenger.” This apparent split  between “true” self  and
“false” persona says a lot about popular conceptions of
the  performative  nature  of  the  self  in  contemporary
culture, and provides a useful framework for unpacking
some of the aporias generated by the concept of persona.
My  aim  in  the  present  context  is  to  substantiate  the
argument that persona studies needs to engage with the
philosophical discourse of “self” and “authenticity” if it is
to provide a convincing account of the status and function
of persona today. The term “persona” derives from the
classical  Latin  word for  mask,  and has its  roots  in  the
theatre of ancient Greece. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines the term thus:
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1.  An  Assumed  character  or  role,  especially  one  adopted  by  an
author in his or her writing, or by a performer.
2.a. as the aspect of  a person’s character that is displayed to or
perceived by others.
b. Psychol. In Jungian psychology: the outer or assumed aspect of
character; a set of attitudes adopted by an individual to fit his or her
perceived social role. Contrasted with anima.
For  Jung  the  persona  is  “a  complicated  system  of
relations  between individual  consciousness  and  society,
fittingly  enough  a  kind  of  mask,  designed  on  the  one
hand to make a definite impression upon others, and, on
the other, to conceal  the true nature of the individual”
(305). We can see that all these usages share a theatrical
or  actorly  dimension.  Persona  is  something  we  adopt,
display,  or  assume.  Further,  it  is  an  external  quality,
which masks, presumably, that which is not assumed or
displayed—the private self.  Thus,  persona is  predicated
on an opposition between inside and outside. Moreover, it
is not a value neutral concept, but one, I will argue, that
connotes a sense of “inauthenticity” through suggesting a
division between self and role. 
The “self”  is  a  complicated word with  a  wide range of
usages and connotations. The OED notes that when used
with reference to a person the word refers to an essential
entity.
3. Chiefly Philos. That which in a person is really and intrinsically he
(in  contradistinction  to  what  is  adventitious);  the  ego  (often
identified  with  the  soul  or  mind  as  opposed  to  the  body);  a
permanent  subject  of  successive  and  varying  states  of
consciousness.
Of course both terms are further complicated by the way
they function within specific specialised discourses. Jung’s
use  of  the  term  “persona”  is  part  of  a  complex
psychological  theory of  personality,  and the term “self”
appears in a multitude of forms in a plethora of scholarly
disciplines.  The  “self”  is  obviously  a  key  concept  in
psychology  and  philosophy,  where  it  is  sometimes
conflated with something called the subject, or discussed
with reference to questions of  personal  identity.  Michel
Foucault’s project to track “the constitution of the subject
across history which has led us up to the modern concept
of the self” (202) is perhaps the most complex and rich
body of work with which persona studies must reckon if it
is  to  produce  a  distinctive  account  of  the  relationship
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between  persona  and  self.  In  broad  terms,  this  paper
advocates  a  loosely  Foucauldian  approach  to
understanding the relationship between self and persona,
but defers a detailed encounter with Foucault’s work on
the subject (which requires a much larger canvas).
For  the  moment  I  want  to  focus  on  the  status  of
authenticity in the self/persona relationship with specific
reference to world of Dexter, which provides an accessible
forum for examining a contemporary manifestation of the
self/persona  relationship  with  specific  reference  to  the
question  of  authenticity.  Dexter  conveys  the  division
between authentic inner self and persona through the use
of a first person narrative voice that provides a running
commentary  on  the  character’s  thoughts,  and  exposes
the gap between Dexter’s various social roles and his real
sociopathic  self.  Dexter  Morgan  is,  of  course,  an
unreliable narrator, yet he is acutely aware of how others
perceive him, and his narrative voice-over functions as a
device to bind the viewer to the character’s first-person
perspective. This is important because Dexter is devoid of
empathy—he lacks  the  ability  to  feel  genuine emotion,
and  conform  to  the  social  conventions  that  govern
everyday  activities,  yet  he  is  focus  of  audience
identification.  This  means  the  voice-over  must  perform
the work of making Dexter sympathetic.
The voice-over narration in Dexter is characterised by an
obsession with the presentation of self, and the disparity
between self and persona. In an early episode, Dexter’s
narrative voice proclaims a love of Halloween because it
is  “the  one  time  of  year  when  everyone  wears  a
mask—not just me. People think it's fun to pretend you're
a  monster.  Me,  I  spend  my  life  pretending  I'm  not.
Brother,  friend,  boyfriend—all  part  of  my  costume
collection” (Dexter “Let’s Give the Boy a Hand”).
Dexter develops a series of social masks and routines to
disguise  his  “real”  self.  He  is  compelled  to  develop  a
series of elaborate ruses to appear like a regular guy—a
“normal” person who needs to perform a series of social
roles. He thus becomes a studious observer of everyday
life, and much of the show’s appeal lies in the way he
dissects the minutiae of human behavior in order to learn
how be normal. Indeed, because he does not comprehend
emotion he must  learn how to read the external  signs
that convey care, love, interest,  concern and so on—“I
just  don't  understand all  that  emotion,  which makes it
tough to fake,” he declares (Dexter,  “Popping Cherry”).
Each social role requires a considerable degree of actorly
preparation,  and  Dexter  demonstrates  what  we  might
call,  with Erving Goffman, a dramaturgical  approach to
everyday life (2).
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In  short,  Dexter
For example, Dexter enters into a relationship with Rita,
an  ostensibly  naïve,  doe-eyed  single  mother  of  two
children and a victim of  domestic  violence—he chooses
her because he believes that she is as damaged as he is,
and  unlikely  to  challenge  him  too  strongly—“Rita's
ex-hubby,  the  crack  addict,  repeatedly  raped  her,
knocked  her  around.  Ever  since  then  she's  been
completely  uninterested  in  sex.  That  works  for  me!”
(Dexter  “Dexter”).  Rita  provides  the  perfect  cover
because she facilitates Dexter’s construction of himself as
a normal, heterosexual family man. However, in order to
play this most paradigmatic normative role, he must learn
how  to  play  with  children,  and  feign  affection  and
intimacy.  J.  M. Tyree observes that  Dexter  “employs a
fake-it-till-you-make-it strategy for imitating normal life”
(82).  Of  course,  he  cannot  maintain  the  role  too  long
before  Rita  becomes suspicious,  and aware  of  Dexter’s
repeated lies and evasions.
 dramatises  what  Goffman  calls
impression management—the character of Dexter Morgan
must  consistently  “give  off”  signs  of  normativity  (80).
Goffman  argues  that  we  are  all  compelled  to  perform
social  roles  in  the manner of  Dexter,  and this  perhaps
accounts  for  why  the  show  appealed  to  such  a  wide
audience.  In  many  ways,  Dexter  exposes  normative
behavior as an “act” that nobody can sustain no matter
how  hard  they  try.  Dexter’s  struggle  to  decode  the
conventions  that  govern  everyday  life  make  him  a
sympathetic  character  despite  his  obviously  sociopathic
tendencies.  In  other  words  we  are  all  a  little  bit  like
Dexter insofar we must all perform social roles we may
not  find comfortable.  Of  course,  the  whole  question of
impression management in  Dexter  becomes even more
complex  if  one  considers  Michael  C.  Hall’s  celebrity
persona and his performance as the titular character, but
I do not have the space to pursue this line of inquiry in
the present context.
So, Dexter is a consummate actor within his “everyday”
world, and neatly, perhaps too neatly, confirms Goffman’s
“dramaturgical” theory of the “self.” In his essay, “Letter
to a Poor Actor” David E. R. George provides a fascinating
critique  of  Goffman  from  the  perspective  of  a  theatre
studies scholar. George provocatively claims that Goffman
was  attracted  to  theatrical  metaphors  because  of  the
“anti-theatrical  prejudice” embedded within the western
tradition. George cites Jonash Barish’s authoritative tome
on  this  topic,  which  argues  “that  with  infrequent
exceptions, terms borrowed from the theatre—theatrical,
operatic,  melodramatic, stagey, etc.—tend to be hostile
or belittling” (1).
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Dexter
Barish cites instances of this prejudice from Plato through
to  St  Augustine  and  beyond,  and  George  situates
Goffman within this powerful tradition. He writes,
the  theatrum  mundi  metaphor  has  always  been  a  recipe  for
paranoia,  and  in  this  respect  Goffman  appears  merely  to  be
continuing a long philosophical tradition: the actor-as-paranoiac puts
on  the  maximum number  of  masks  to  protect  a  threatened  and
fragile  self  against  the  daily  threat  of  intimacy,  disrespect,
deception. (353)
It  is  hardly  surprising,  then,  that  Dexter,  a  paranoid
sociopath, stands as an exemplary instance of Goffman’s
dramaturgical conception of the self, for Dexter is a show
that  consistently  presents  narratives  about  the
relationship between the need to protect the “fragile” self
through the construction of various personae. George also
argues,  with  Lyman  and  Scott,  that  a  “dramatistic”
approach to understanding the world produces a cynical
perspective  because  drama  is  predicated  on  the  split
between  appearance  and  reality,  nothing  is  what  it
appears to be, and nobody is what they appear to be (7).
The actor, traditionally, has always worn a mask in some
form  or  another.  From  the  literal  masks  worn  by  the
actors  in  ancient  Greece  to  the  sophisticated  make-up
and prosthetic devices worn by today’s thespians, actors,
even  when  they  are  supposedly  playing  themselves,
expose the gap between self and persona. Arguably, the
most  challenging  and  provocative  aspect  of  George’s
theory of the actor for persona studies lies in his thesis
about how the reviled art of the theatre, which has been
pilloried  for  so  many  centuries,  can  function  as  a
paradigm for authenticity. He cites Artaud and Grotowski
as examples of two iconic figures that view the theatre as
a  sacred space that  facilitates ‘close encounters  of  the
authentic kind (George 361).
George  attempts  to  rescue  an  authentic  core  identity,
which he perceives to be under siege from the likes of
Goffman, who proffers an “onion” model of the self. In
George’s  reading,  Goffman  produces  a  self  without  an
essential, authentic core. This is hardly surprising given
Goffman’s  background.  As  an  advocate  of  symbolic
interactionism, a school of sociology that proposes that
the  self  is  produced  as  a  result  of  various  acts  of
socialisation, Goffman’s dramaturgical account of the self
reinforces George Herbert Mead’s belief that “when a self
does appear it always involves an experience of another;
there could not be an experience of the self  simply by
itself” (195).
 not only dramatises this self/other dynamic, but
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also  underscores  the  extent  to  which  we,  to  use  the
terminology  of  Benita  Luckmann,  inhabit  a  series  of
“small  life-worlds.” In other words, we lead a series of
part-time  lives  in  part-time  worlds—modern  life,  for
Luckmann writing in 1970, unfolds on multiple stages that
are not necessarily connected or operate according to the
same regulatory principles. She writes,
The multi-world existence of modern man requires frequent ‘gear-
shifting.’  As he moves from one small  world into the next,  he is
faced  with  at  least  marginally  different  expectations,  requiring
different role performances in concert with different sets of people.
(590)
Dexter must negotiate a variety of different social roles,
each with different requirements and demands. He must,
therefore,  cultivate  a  professional  persona  as  a  blood-
splatter  analyst,  and  perform  the  personal  roles  of
brother, lover, husband, and so on. Each of these roles
occurs in a different “life world” and requires a different
presentation of self. Luckmann’s analysis of modern life
remains compelling despite being written more than 40
years  ago,  and  she  raises  one  of  the  most  crucial
questions  for  persona  studies:  what  “self,”  if  any,
functions as the executive “gear-shifter?” In Dexter, the
narrative voice, the voice behind the masks implies such
an  essential  entity—the  true,  authentic  self,  which  is
consistent with Jung’s account of the relationship between
self and persona.
Despite  a  welter  of  critical  theory  that  debunks  the
possibility  of  an  essential,  self-identical,  authentic  self
(from  Adorno’s  anti-Heideggerean  argument  in  The
Jargon  of  Authenticity  to  various  post-structuralist
theories  of  subjectivity,  especially  Judith  Butler’s
conception of  performativity)  the idea of  sovereign self
stubbornly  persists  in  everyday  discourse.  One  of  the
tasks  of  persona  studies  must  be  to  examine  these
common notions of self  and authenticity. On one level,
most  people  experience  the  “self”  as  something  that
refers to what we might call a singular sense of being,
and speak about when the feel “most like themselves.”
For some, the self emerges within the private realm, the
“backstage”  areas  to  use  Goffman’s  terminology  (3).
Others speak of feeling most like themselves in executing
a social role or some kind of professional occupation. For
example,  take  this  extract  from  a  contemporary
self-growth web site:
Are you feeling like you don’t know who you are anymore?
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Or  maybe  you  feel  like  you  never  really  knew yourself.  Perhaps
you’ve  gone  through  most  of  your  life  living  by  other  people’s
agendas or ideas of who you should be, and are just now realizing
that you really don’t know yourself, your dreams, or your purpose.
(Ewing 2013)
From the Platonic exhortation to “know thyself” through
to  the  advice  dispensed  by  self-help  gurus,  the  self
emerges as a persistent, if elusive, trope in scholarly and
everyday discourse. Persona studies needs to reckon with
the  scope  and  breadth  of  the  deployment  of  the  self.
Indeed  it  is  the  very  ubiquity  of  terms  like  self,
authenticity,  and  persona  that  require  genealogical
analysis in the Foucauldian sense of the term. This task
entails  looking  for  and  uncovering  the  conditions  of
possibility for talking about the self across a wide range of
contexts.
In summary, then, I contend that persona studies needs
to  carefully  examine  the  relationship  between  various
theories  of  self  and  the  discourse  of  authenticity,  and
establish  the  extent  to  which  Goffman’s  apparently
cynical  account  for  the  self  challenges  the  assumed
authenticity  of  the  self  in  the  Jungian  paradigm.  Of
course, there are many other approaches one could take
to  this  question.  For  example,  Sartrean  existentialism
problematises  any  simple  opposition  between  self  and
persona in its insistence that the self is the product of the
others’  perceptions  of  the  subject.  This  position  is
captured in his famous maxim that “hell is other people.”
This  is  not  because  other  people  are  inherently
antagonistic or hostile, but that one’s sense of self is in
the hands of  others.  Sartre dramatises this  conundrum
elegantly in his 1944 play, No Exit.
Sartre’s  philosophy  also  engages  with  the  discourse  of
authenticity, which it borrows from Heidegger’s Being and
Time.  Existentialism,  in  its  many  guises,  dominated
continental philosophy up until the 1960s and popularised
the idea of “authenticity” as an ideal, which enables one
to avoid the tyranny of the “They” and avoid the pitfalls of
living in bad faith. There is a possibility that the nascent
discipline of Persona Studies, as articulated by P. David
Marshall and others, risks ignoring the crucial relationship
between  the  discourse  of  authenticity  and  the
presentation  of  self  by  concentrating  on  the
“presentational  self”  as  a  set  of  pragmatic,  tactical
techniques  designed  to  maximise  the  impact  of
impression  management  within  a  variety  of  social  and
professional  contexts  (Marshall  “Persona”;  Barbour  and
Marshall  “Academic”).  A  more  detailed  and  direct
engagement  with  Foucault’s  account  of  the  emergence
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